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e Ethics of Exploitation
Paul McLaughlin
Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu
Philosophical inquiry into exploitation has two major deciencies to date: it as-
sumes that exploitation is wrong by denition; and it pays too much attention to
the Marxian account of exploitation. Two senses of exploitation should be distin-
guished: the ‘moral’ or pejorative sense and the ‘non-moral’ or ‘non-prejudicial’
sense. By demonstrating the conceptual inadequacy of exploitation as dened in
the rst sense, and by dening exploitation adequately in the latter sense, we seek
to demonstrate the moral complexity of exploitation. We contend, moreover, that
moral evaluation of exploitation is only possible once we abandon a strictly Marx-
ian framework and attempt, in the long run, to develop an integral ethic along God-
winian lines.
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1. Introduction
is paper analyses and evaluates social exploitation or exploitation as a fea-
ture of human relations. It is not concerned with environmental exploita-
tion or exploitation as a feature of ecological relations. e latter issue is of
great importance, andmay be related to the former issue in some signicant
way: perhaps (anthropologically) the very notion of exploiting our natural
environment is only conceivable in a socially exploitative context; and per-
haps (economically) environmental exploitation requires human exploita-
tion.1 Unfortunately, we must leave such issues aside for now and try to
make some moral sense of social exploitation as such.
What is indisputable is that (social) exploitation is, for the most part,
a highly pejorative term: nobody wants to be ‘exploited’, and we seldom if
ever recognise the right of somebody to ‘exploit’. However, exploitation is
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6 The Ethics of Exploitation
also a rather complex concept, and a much more problematic moral issue
than is immediately apparent. We seek, therefore, to answer two questions
in this paper. First, what is exploitation? And, second, what, if anything,
is wrong with it? Before we answer these questions, however, we need to
pay a little attention to the dominant intellectual tradition of thought on
exploitation, namely Marxism.is is a tradition towards which the author
feels simultaneously indebted and antipathetic. Such an attitude (at least
with respect to theMarxian account of exploitation) will be explained, if not
justied, in the next section.
2. Marxism and Exploitation
Two aspects ofMarx’s account of exploitation should be distinguished, thou-
gh they rarely are: its intuitive appeal and its explanatory value.e intuitive
appeal of his account derives from commonmoral intuitions concerning ex-
ploitation rather than anythingmorally signicant thatMarx says—or is try-
ing to say—about it. Indeed, the very point here is that Marx is not making
any substantive moral claims about exploitation (or about capitalism in gen-
eral). (However, if we insist on reading Marx as a moral thinker, we would
have to conclude that he believes that “capitalist exploitation is just.” Wood
2004, 138)2 For Marx, exploitation is essentially a descriptive term of social
science, not a normative term of moral philosophy. If we interpret it in the
latter sense, this implies that we have a moral interest in the phenomenon
that Marx describes, or that we intuitively disapprove of it in the cases that
2 is is so because justice is determined, according toMarx, on the terms of a givenmode of
production. Capitalist exploitation is justied in a capitalist society. For Marx, there is no
highermoral standard. ButMarx does not believe thatmoral discourse can tell us anything
fundamentally interesting about capitalism and its historical development. Indeed, he is
indierent to the ethics of capitalism and exploitation.
Chapters 9, 10, and 16 ofWood’s book provide a particularly interesting discussion of these
issues. For an alternative, “moral” reading ofMarx’s account of exploitation—orwhat I take
to be a moralized account of exploitation in aMarxian key—see (Arneson 1981).e main
point that Arneson makes is the following (Arneson 1981, 208): “In numerous texts Marx
employs rhetoric that strongly suggests he strongly believes the exploitation of capitalist
and other class societies to be morally wrong. In some of these passages Marx oers broad
hints as to why he regards exploitation as wrong. But he neither develops these hints nor
explains their basis.” Even if there are moral suggestions and hints in Marx’s writings (in
fact, there are), this does not mean that Marx is engaging in moral philosophy or that he
thinks highly of it. He clearly does not, and is concerned to approach the issue of exploita-
tion in a dierent, “scientic” way. See also G.A. Cohen’s review of Wood’s book (Cohen
1983). Cohen defends a moral reading of Marx, arguing that because Marx describes capi-
talist exploitation as a form of “the” (on terms other than its own), he must have a moral
point in mind. However, such pronouncements strike me as rhetorical (as Arneson be-
lieves) and as inessential to Marx’s intellectual project.
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Marx seeks to understand (principally, the alleged exploitation of labour in
capitalist society). However, for Marx, our disapproval adds nothing to our
understanding of exploitation; on the contrary, it leads us o intomere ide-
ological dispute (moral philosophy and the like). Now, one might reject
Marx’s position here: one might defend moral philosophy against ideolog-
ical charges; one might deny the non-normativity of what Marx is talking
about. But in doing this, one simply moves away from Marx. is is ne
in principle, but it leaves one wondering why some who do so still cling on
to Marx: why they need him at all, at least for the purposes of substantive
moral discourse.
Two related answers to this question may be noted: the ideological and
the authoritative. In the rst place, one’s ideological commitment to Marx
andMarxismmight compel one to investigate all issues—including those to
which Marx was indierent or even hostile—with reference to the ideolog-
ical master himself. If Marx provides exact answers to all questions, or at
least holds the key to the solution of all problems, then moral inquiry into
exploitation must begin with him. In response, one might simply argue that
unquestioning ideological commitment has no place in philosophy. How-
ever, even those who are uncommitted in this sense may avail of Marx as
some kind of intellectual authority, or, at any rate, the most notable intel-
lectual who had anything interesting to say about exploitation. But the fact
thatMarx had something signicant to say about exploitation does notmake
him any kind of ethical authority or even ethically relevant here.
With respect to the explanatory value of Marx’s account of exploita-
tion, we have little to oer. ere is a widespread view (shared by certain
neo-classical economists and analytical Marxists) that Marx’s explanatory
account—of the exploitation of labour for prot through the appropriation
of surplus value—is undermined by its reliance on the labour theory of value
as “an antiquated tool which does not hold up against modern standards
of generality and rigour.” (Roemer 1986, 199)3 But the success or failure of
Marx’s (supposedly scientic) theory has no bearing on our ethical discus-
sion. As Jonathan Wol writes, “e truth of [exploitation] does not de-
pend on any particular theory of value or prot.” (Wol 2002, 117)4 e
3 Other analytical Marxists like Allen Wood dispute this view.
4 For a very readable introduction to Marx’s theory of exploitation, see pp. 66–81 of this
work.e major analytical Marxist study of exploitation is (Roemer 1982). Such work has,
of course, been challenged by other, more traditional Marxists: “rational choice Marxists
have been criticised. . . for their apparently excessive individualism and taking for granted
what can only be explained by more structural concepts. . .e fact that Marxist social sci-
entists borrowed methods employed in neoclassical economics such as game theory and
general equilibrium theory was, to say the least, paradoxical. . . and it is not surprising that
not much of Marx survived” (McLellan 2007, 388).
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phenomenon of exploitation persists, and we intend to subject it to ethical
examination.
In large part, then, what we will analyse and evaluate is precisely what
Marx sought (and arguably failed) to explain. Indeed, our use of the same
paradigmatic examples below (of exploitation in labour relations) may sug-
gest that we have not escaped the Marxian framework at all, that we are
somehow constrained by Marxian categories, however we might go about
obfuscating them ideologically (that is to say, ethically). Nevertheless, dis-
cussing the same phenomenon (among others)—in fact, discussing it in a
dierent way—does not indicate actual dependence on (or implicit commit-
ment to) the “original” (Marxian) account. Marx has no further role to play
in this paper.
3. What is Exploitation?
A common conception of exploitation is that it consists in the “unfair use” of
other human beings (Arneson 2001, 515). In AlanWertheimer’s words, then,
“An exploitative transaction is one in which A takes unfair advantage of B.”
(Wertheimer 1996, 207)5 While Wertheimer acknowledges that “‘exploita-
tion’ can be employed in a nonmoral sense”, or in a “nonpejorative sense”,
he works with what he calls a “moralized concept” of exploitation according
to which exploitation “is, by denition, wrong because unfair”. Having es-
tablished (or merely asserted) this “(moral) fact of exploitation”, he points to
two vital questions concerning exploitation in its various forms: its “moral
weight”, that is, how wrong it is, and its “moral force”, that is, what its moral
“upshots” are for those involved and for society as awhole (Wertheimer 1996,
5–6).6
e questions that Wertheimer raises are doubtless important. But can
we be satised with his basic conception of exploitation as “taking unfair ad-
vantage”?ere are at least two problems with it. In the rst place, it would
seem to be over-extensive. ere are acts (say, cases of murder) that meet
the denition without (at least intuitively) constituting acts of exploitation
(unless we can exploit a human life as such).7 Secondly, and more seriously,
5 I draw extensively on the work of Wertheimer here, notwithstanding my disagreements
with him. See Robert Goodin’s critical review of Wertheimer’s book (Goodin 1997).
6 e denition of exploitation in theOxford English Dictionary (Second Edition, 1989) cap-
tures the distinction between its moral and non-moral senses. us, in the latter sense,
exploitation is “e action of. . . turning to account”, while in the former sense, it is “e
action of turning to account for selsh purposes, [or] using for one’s own prot.”
7 Richard Arneson concedes as much: “it would be incorrect usage to apply the term “ex-
ploitation” to immoral acts that are rightly described as involving unfair use but that also
t a narrower of more odious concept. For example, murdering someone would not be
characterized as exploitation even though the murderer prots [or may prot] from the
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this conception of exploitation rests on the moral assumption that exploita-
tion is “unfair”.8 Such a conception rests on a negative connotation—or the
pejorative usage—of exploitation without demonstrating its conceptual ad-
equacy. In like manner, one might dene domination, for example, as the
unfair control of other human beings. But the unfairness of such control
needs to be demonstrated, not merely asserted (as denitional of domina-
tion). And there certainly seem to be cases of justiable domination (for
example, the physical restraint of a violent drunk). Might not this also be
true of exploitation?
Exploitation in itself denotes no more than utilization or benecial use.
And wemight conceivably utilize ‘resources’ (including so-called ‘human re-
sources’) in a fair way, even when such use is to our own advantage (rela-
tively, at least). How might we dene social exploitation in a way that leaves
themoral question (about its ‘fairness’, justiability, and so on) open? In gen-
eral terms, it would seem to involve the advantageous use of other persons.
But, more systematically, we can claim the following:
Exploitation is a form of social power (of eective capacity in human
relations) which involves the capacity of party A (the exploiter) (i) to
benet from some characteristic of party B (the exploited),9 and (ii)
to do so at party B’s expense.10
ere are three features of exploitation on this denition which need to
be explicated (two from (i), the third from (ii)): (a) the characteristics of B
from which Amight benet; (b) the benets to A; and (c) the losses to B.
(a) e characteristics of B from which A might benet include those
‘positives’ which might be exploited, such as productivity, talent, and at-
tractiveness, as well as a number of ‘negatives’ which might be similarly
exploited, such as poverty, physical or psychological dependence, and ig-
norance. us, in positive terms, the employer might exploit a productive
act and thus unfairly uses the victim” (Arneson 2001, 515).
8 By contrast, Ruth J. Sample’s conception in (Sample 2003) rests on the assumption that
exploitation is “degrading”. In his critique of her work, Wertheimer makes a point that
might also be directed at me: “I am not sympathetic to Sample’s conceptual “essentialism”,
to explaining what exploitation “is”. . .e important task is to identify the way in which
transactions can be wrong and what we should do about them, not what words we should
use” (Wertheimer 2007, 259). While the dispute over “unfairness” and “degradation”might
amount to a semantic quibble, the dispute over whether the concept of exploitation should
be ‘moralized’ (or subjected to heavymoral stipulation) in any way does not. On this issue,
see (Wood 2004, 242–46).
9 “Common to all exploitation. . . is that Amakes a prot by turning some characteristic of
B to his own advantage” (Feinberg 1988, 176).
10 “An exploitative exchange is. . . an exchange in which the exploited party gets less than the
exploiting party, who does better at the exploited party’s expense” (Levine 1988, 66).
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employee, while, in negative terms, the rich might exploit the desperately
poor.
(b)e benet in question is usually material, though it is conceivable
in other terms: psychological, sexual, “spiritual”, and so on. Hence, the psy-
chologically, sexually, or spiritually “strong” might exploit the psychologi-
cally, sexually, or spiritually “weak”. In general terms, the exploiter benets
in the way of power, whether this power consists in possessions and wealth
or psychological, sexual, or spiritual dominance. Indeed, it is arguable that
exploitation is premised on unequal relations of power: that to exploit, one
must occupy a position of greater relative power in the rst place (however
localized this powermight be). If this is so, inequality of powermight gener-
ate greater inequality of power. Accordingly, we observe that money begets
money, for instance.
(c) Crucially, what A gains in an exploitative relationship represents a
loss of some kind to B. (Were B to lose nothing, it would be senseless to claim
that B was being exploited.) We should consider this loss in both material
and non-material terms. Two cases spring to mind: the loss of “the full fruit
of one’s labour”, and the loss of one’s “dignity”.
In material production, understood as the production of ‘wealth’ in ac-
cordance with (real or apparent) ‘human needs’, Amight benet (say, make
a prot) through the labour of B. In such a situation, B might be held to
lose either the product of his labour or the full value of his labour (receiving
either a subsistence or more substantial wage in return). As such, B would
be exploited by A. is remains the case even when we maintain that B re-
ceives a “fair day’s wages for a fair day’s work”. e dierence here would
merely be that the degree of exploitation is smaller and perhaps more obvi-
ously ‘fair’ or justiable. Moreover, the exploitative relation between A and
B holds whether the mode of production is capitalist or communist (leaving
slave, feudal, and other economies aside). e dierence between capitalist
and communist exploitation is that B’s loss is private gain (‘prot’ in the or-
dinary sense) in the former case and public gain (for the ‘common weal’) in
the latter.
Non-material or cultural aspects of exploitation are more dicult to
analyse than material or economic aspects.11 Moreover, the attempt to pri-
oritize one aspect over the other (usually the latter over the former, in ac-
cordance with the ‘materialist conception of history’, for instance) is fraught
with diculties. Butwhat B appears to losewhennon-materially exploited is
his or her ‘dignity’, a loss that is entailed by a process of ‘humiliation’. (What
11 It might be observed that the analysis of non-material exploitation is more characteristic
of the liberal tradition, while the analysis of material exploitation is more characteristic of
the socialist tradition.
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A appears to gain from B’s loss is simply power of some kind. For example,
B’s humiliationmight lendA a sense of superiority or of prowess.) Of course,
labour might be humiliating in itself, even when it is well rewarded in mate-
rial terms. Accordingly, a prostitute or stripper might be highly paid but still
exploited (non-materially). Indeed, sexual exploitation in its widest sense
(based on, for example, the domestication or objectication of women) is
a major category of non-material exploitation, though it has a material as-
pect too (in the exploitation of the domestic and even non-domestic labour
of women in particular). Another category of non-material exploitation is
“spiritual” exploitation. us, we witness religious and cult leaders exploit-
ing the psychologically weak (and usually exploiting them materially too).
How arewe tomake sense of the loss of dignity? We can interpret dignity
(rather simplistically for current purposes) as consisting in the ‘equality (of
value) of persons’, or the recognition of the same. Where inequality of per-
sonhood ismanifested, or the recognition of basic equality is lacking, dignity
is lost. Non-material exploitation and humiliation are the very antithesis of
‘dignied existence’ and equality of personhood.
We will conclude our analysis of exploitation by noting four important
elements that, while they may be present, are not necessary for exploitation
to occur. One is manipulation. It is sometimes argued that one cannot be
exploited unless one is somehow duped into giving up something thatmight
benet another. Onemight, say, convince a naïve child to undertake valuable
menial labour with the oer of a bag of sweets (in the traditional parental
manner). However, there are clear cases of exploitation—that of the slave,
for example—where a factor other than manipulation is compelling: here
coercive force overrides the need to manipulate the exploited party.
Another unnecessary element is coercion itself. While the slave owner
coerces his slaves in order to exploit them, other examples of exploitation
seem to be non-coercive. Most exploitative instances of labour under cap-
italist conditions are thought to be non-coercive; such relations appear to
be entered into voluntarily out of ‘rational self-interest’. (is is not neces-
sarily the case with labour under communist conditions, by contrast.) is
point about capitalist employment does, of course, assume that meaningful
alternatives are available to the exploited party, such as less exploitative or
non-exploitative means of survival. However, even work in the non-prot
sector is problematic in this context. One can, aer all, be exploited for ben-
ets (even material benets) other than prot (such as the higher salary of
one’s superiors in non-prot organizations, which may be non-materially
exploitative in any case).
A third unnecessary element of exploitation is vulnerability.is seems
problematic since we have claimed that exploitation may be premised on
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inequality of power, and since many exploited parties (children, the sick,
etc.) are indeed vulnerable (economically, physically, or psychologically).
e “weak” would seem to be vulnerable. However, many exploited parties
are in positions of some strength (while still less powerful overall than the ex-
ploiting party), and these positions render them less than vulnerable.us,
a technical expert in some eld can command particularly good working
conditions, while he remains a source of prot for his employer. Moreover,
he may have the real possibility to work elsewhere, though also in a prot
making capacity. Systematically, therefore, he can be said to be vulnerable;
but he is not necessarily so with respect to specic transactions.12
A nal unnecessary element of exploitation is harm to the exploited
party.13 While exploitation is oen detrimental to the exploited party’s inter-
ests or well-being, it need not necessarily be so. Indeed, again in the context
of employment under capitalist conditions, the fact that one is materially
exploited need not harm one’s interests in consumption. Indeed, outside of
capitalist economy, many of these interests (assuming that they are still felt)
may not be satised at all. Or, spiritually, the fact that a religion may exploit
one’s psychological weaknesses may not be (felt to be) harmful; indeed, the
exploitative religion may more than adequately compensate for one’s weak-
nesses (or, at least, one may be under the consoling illusion that it does so).
In either case, the absence of the exploitative relation may be detrimental to
one’s interests—though, of course, wemight look for a less exploitative third
option.
A potential objection to our analysis ought to be considered before we
more on to the evaluation of exploitation. It might be granted that the “mor-
alized” concept of exploitation is too expansive and too assertive. But one
may questionwhether the “nonmoral” concept ultimately serves us any bett-
er—and, indeed, whether the very concept of exploitation is useful at all.
Doubtless, the nonmoral concept is less assertive; this is preciselywhatmakes
it nonmoral. But is it less expansive? Does it describe so much that it be-
comes descriptively useless? One might be inclined to argue that all social
interaction involves the capacity of one party to benet from a certain char-
acteristic of another party and to do so at the latter’s expense; or, in other
words, to argue that all social relations are exploitative. But while it is true
to say that many social relations are exploitative (and that such matters are
descriptively or sociologically troublesome), it would seem unjustiably re-
ductive to say that all of them are exploitative. Are we willing to claim that
12 I diverge on this point fromWood (see, in particular, Wood 2004, 254–55).
13 On the second and fourth elements, Feinberg notes: “exploitation. . . can occur in morally
unsavoury forms without harming the exploitee’s interests and. . .despite the exploitee’s
fully voluntary consent to the exploitative behaviour” (Feinberg 1988, 176–79).
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all instances of friendship are exploitative, for instance? If so, then what are
the losses that are incurred by the supposedly exploited “friend” in all such
instances? In any case, that exploitation is a widespread phenomenon on
our analysis does not diminish the analysis. Exploitation is a widespread
phenomenon. Our purpose has simply been to analyse it—to pin it down
to the extent that such a widespread phenomenon can be pinned down—in
order to evaluate it.
4. Is AnythingWrongWith Exploitation?
Wecanonly oer a brief and preliminary evaluation of exploitation here. But
it should be noted that our purpose is not to show why and when exploita-
tion is ‘unfair’ (or to question the moral ‘weight’ and ‘force’ of exploitation
as ‘unfair use’) but to ask the less prejudicial question as to whether or not it
is justiable. Furthermore, it should be emphasised that our aim here is not
to equivocate over some kind of social abuse, still less to justify the unjusti-
able. e author is no apologist for capitalism: I am particularly hostile to
neo-liberalism, for example. Nor is the author morally indierent to human
suering and injustice: my position could be broadly characterised as a lib-
ertarian humanism. But there is good reason to seek to comprehend what
we intuitively oppose. Such comprehension can lend greater weight to our
convictions, though it requires intellectual eort and may require that we
modify our views.
In evaluating exploitative practices and institutions, at least three kinds
of moral argument can be called upon. e rst kind leads to the conclu-
sion that exploitation is unjustiable.e second kind indicates that certain
forms of exploitation are justiable. And the third kind can lead in both
directions. e three kinds of argument are, in turn, (a) deontological, (b)
voluntaristic, and (c) consequentialist.
(a)e Kantian ‘deontological’ argument against exploitation has it that
it is always wrong to treat human beings (or rational agents) as means to an
end, or, specically here, as instruments of power or prot.14 e advanta-
geous use of B by A is wrong, irrespective of the consequences, that is, the
losses that B may incur. While this argument has some appeal—especially
with respect to issues of dignity and the more extreme cases of exploitation
(such as slavery)—it may be held to preclude too much in the way of real
human practice. It seems to preclude all forms of employment (other than
self-employment) and even any kind of division of labour. Every division of
labour may be said to be exploitative: to benet some at the expense of oth-
14 Of course, this is not the only kind of deontological argument, but it is particularly relevant
in the discussion of exploitation.
14 The Ethics of Exploitation
ers, even if such a situation is mutually benecial. Indeed, this would seem
to point to an instance ofmutual exploitation. us, in a case where parties
A and B cooperate and apply their respective skills in the pursuit of a goal, A
may be said to exploit a positive characteristic of B while B simultaneously
exploits another (or conceivably the same) positive characteristic ofA. What
A and B gain in this situation may be a superior product of labour, a lessen-
ing of the eort required to produce it, and greater leisure time. What they
lose is arguably the full fruit of their own individual labour. is would not
disturb most of us in principle, but the ‘mutual use’ of rational agents might
worry an extreme Kantian.
(b) Voluntaristic arguments concerning exploitation maintain that it is
justiable if and only if it is consented to (again, irrespective of the con-
sequences or losses incurred). at is to say, if one freely and knowingly
chooses to enter into an exploitative relationship, then that relationship is
legitimate. We argued, above, that coercion is not a necessary element of
exploitation and that exploitative relationships could, in principle, be vol-
untarily entered into.us, on voluntaristic terms, exploitation is justiable
in some instances. However, it is clear that not all exploitation is consented
to: the slave has no choice, the child may not know any better, and so on.
Moreover, the degree of consent evident in relations of capitalist employ-
ment (to return to the example cited above) is open to question. Do we
consent to being instruments of prot for the capitalist employer, or are we
forced to do so in some sense aer all? What are the likely consequences
of dissent? Do these suggest that there is a meaningful choice available?
Many would be troubled by voluntaristic instances of, and justications for,
‘self-sacrice’, ‘self-abnegation’, and ‘prostitution’ in a very broad sense. e
obvious moral objection is that the voluntaristic doctrine concerning ex-
ploitation is morally vacuous, at least in cases that are judged to be socially
problematic or matters of genuine public concern.
(c) We might evaluate exploitation solely with reference to its conse-
quences, some of which (like ‘social utility’) might be held to be justifying.
us, irrespective of issues of ‘dignity’ and consent, exploitation might or
might not be justied. ere are, of course, problems with this line of rea-
soning. Firstly, quite how we assess these matters (making, for example,
‘interpersonal comparisons of utility’) is questionable. And, secondly, this
approach would seem to conict with certain cherished moral intuitions
(about the rights of individuals, for instance). Are we really to accept the
sacrice of the individual (say, the exploitation of the worker) to social well-
being (expressed, say, in terms of ‘economic growth’)? And if we are not,
according to the utilitarian, why not? ese are complex issues that have
bedevilled utilitarians, at least, for many years.
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Argumentation about thesematters could conceivably combine elements
of the dierent ethical approaches. We could, for example, adopt a con-
sequentialist approach, limited by certain moral intuitions (about human
freedom and dignity). Indeed, this leads us in the direction of the author’s
own approach to the problem. at is not to say that arbitrary pluralism
is advocated as a solution here, but that an integral ethic might enable us
to handle the problem—andmany more moral problems besides.us, one
might subscribe to something like theGodwinian ethic. WilliamGodwin at-
tempted to develop an account of justice that integrated social utilitarianism
with the principle of private judgement.15 Justice, according to him, consists
in social well-being, but can only be determined in each and every instance
by the autonomous agent. Exploitation, on this account, is unjust because
it is (a) socially divisive and (b) irrational. (is does not mean, however,
that it is unjust by denition.) Needless to say, there are philosophical prob-
lems here which cannot be ignored, but Godwin (who is, it should be said,
no mere eclecticist or dialectician) provides an example of rm opposition
to social exploitation on complex moral grounds. While his account may be
overstated and appear to preclude toomuch of the necessary and desirable, it
does demonstrate the possibility of confronting the problem of exploitation
with sophisticatedmoral weapons.ese weapons, however, require further
development, and such development is beyond the scope of this paper.
5. Conclusion
is paper consisted of three parts. In the rst part, we claimed that it was
necessary to advance beyond the Marxian account to a general normative
account of exploitation. In the second part, we oered a non-prejudicial and
non-moralized denition of exploitation. And in the third part, we pointed
to the moral complexity of exploitation and suggested that an integral ethic
would have to be developed for its proper evaluation. Overall, our intention
was not to propose a solution to the problem of exploitation, but to show
that the issue is still live, both with respect to its analysis and especially its
evaluation. Exploitation is not wrong by denition, and it is not obvious why
it is wrong in every instance.
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